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STATE OF WISCONSIN, AND THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA, ex rel. MARC SILVER, 
                           Appellant 
 
v. 
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OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff-relator Marc Silver appeals the District Court’s 
grant of PharMerica Corporation’s1 motion for summary 
                                              
1 PharMerica is the only active appellee in this matter.  
Omnicare, Inc., NNS Healthcare, Inc., and Neighborcare, Inc., 
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judgment and motion to dismiss his qui tam action filed under 
the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33, based 
on the FCA’s public disclosure bar.  That bar generally 
disallows qui tam actions that rely on allegations that are, at 
least in substantial form, already known to the public.  Silver 
alleges that PharMerica — which owns and operates 
institutional pharmacies serving nursing homes — unlawfully 
discounted prices for nursing homes’ Medicare Part A patients 
(reimbursed by the United States (hereinafter, “the 
Government”) to the nursing home on a flat per-diem basis) in 
order to secure contracts to supply services to patients covered 
by Medicare Part D and Medicaid (reimbursed directly to the 
pharmacy by the Government on a cost basis) in the same 
nursing homes.  This practice is known as swapping.  Silver 
challenges the District Court’s conclusion that the alleged 
fraud had already been publicly disclosed.  Specifically, Silver 
asserts that the District Court erred by (1) treating public 
disclosures concerning the general risk of swapping in the 
nursing home industry as a bar to his specific allegations, 
supported by non-public information, that PharMerica was 
actually engaging in swapping, and (2) concluding that the 
fraud was publicly disclosed based upon Silver’s deposition 
testimony that he depended upon publicly available 
documents, without undertaking an independent review to 
determine whether those documents sufficiently disclosed the 
fraud.  As explained below, we agree with Silver and conclude 
that his allegations of fraud were not publicly disclosed.  We 
therefore will reverse and remand.  
 
                                              
were previously dismissed from the underlying suit, and Chem 
Rx Corporation is wholly owned by PharMerica.  
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I. 
 
The incentive for a nursing home to swap arises because 
of the different payment structures noted above.2  The 
Government pays the nursing home a fixed per-diem rate for 
each Part A patient, and from this fixed amount, the nursing 
home must pay for all of the patient’s care, including 
prescription drugs.  Because the nursing home bears the 
financial risk for the amount of drugs dispensed to their Part A 
patients (who tend to be the sickest and so consume the most 
medication), nursing homes are motivated to negotiate with 
pharmacies for the lowest possible drug prices for those 
patients.  In contrast, nursing homes are less concerned about 
the cost of drugs dispensed to Medicaid and Part D patients, 
because the pharmacies collect those payments directly from 
state Medicaid programs or from Part D prescription drug plan 
sponsors; the nursing homes bear no financial risk.  This 
reimbursement structure may be viewed as incentivizing the 
nursing homes to “swap” with the pharmacies for lower drug 
prices for Part A patients in return for allowing the pharmacy 
                                              
2 Our description of how these distinct reimbursement 
policies may induce a nursing home to engage in swapping is 
derived from the parties’ briefs.  Neither party disputes this 
underlying incentive structure, which is amply corroborated by 
the documents in the record.  See, e.g., Appendix (“App.”) 700 
(Health and Human Services advisory opinion describing the 
“obvious motives for agreeing to trade discounts on [per diem 
reimbursement] business for referrals of non-[per diem 
reimbursement] business: the [nursing homes] minimize risk 
of losses under the [per diem reimbursement] system and [the 
service providers] secure business in a highly competitive 
market”). 
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to serve the more lucrative Part D patients.  From the 
perspective of the pharmacies, it could be in their interest to 
provide drugs to Part A patients at even below-cost prices, 
because there are many fewer Part A patients than Part D 
patients, and the profit margins on the services provided to the 
Part D patients that the pharmacies would win the right to serve 
could compensate for the losses incurred serving the Part A 
patients.  
 
Silver alleges that PharMerica did just that:  agreed with 
various nursing homes to provide drugs to Part A patients at 
per-diem rates that were so low (as little as $8 per day) that 
they must have been below cost, in exchange for the right to 
service the nursing home’s other residents at the market rate.  
Because these alleged below-cost payments would thereby 
serve as “remuneration . . . to induce” the nursing homes “to 
refer an individual” — namely, Part D patients — “for the 
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be 
made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program,” 
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A), Silver alleges that the 
swapping violated the Anti-Kickback statute.  Silver 
accordingly brought these claims under the FCA3 and its 
                                              
3 The FCA imposes civil liability on “any person who . 
. . knowingly presents, or causes to be presented [to the federal 
government], a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval,” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), and permits private 
persons to “bring a qui tam action on behalf of the government 
to recover losses incurred because of fraudulent claims,” 
Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 181–
82 (3d Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted).  “If the qui tam suit is 
ultimately successful, the private plaintiff, known as a relator, 
is entitled to up to 30% of the funds the government recovers.”  
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various state-law analogs, alleging that PharMerica 
fraudulently billed the federal government for services that it 
obtained through these alleged kickbacks by, among other 
things, falsely certifying in its reimbursement claims that it was 
complying with the Anti-Kickback rules.     
 
After the District Court denied PharMerica’s Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss — a ruling 
that is not before this Court on appeal — PharMerica filed 
dispositive motions relying upon the public disclosure bar in 
the FCA.  Because the public disclosure bar was jurisdictional 
before it was amended on March 23, 2010, PharMerica moved 
to dismiss Silver’s pre-March 23, 2010 claims for lack of 
jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment on his later 
claims.  The District Court granted both motions, determining 
— based on a number of publicly available documents that 
Silver admits he relied upon to deduce his allegation of fraud 
— that the transactions of fraud were publicly disclosed.  Silver 
timely appealed. 
 
II.4 
 
                                              
Id. at 182.  As noted earlier, Silver is the relator in this FCA 
case.  
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review de novo both a district court’s dismissal of an FCA 
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, United States ex 
rel. Zizic v. Q2Administrators, LLC, 728 F.3d 228, 234 (3d 
Cir. 2013), and its order granting a motion for summary 
judgment, United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark Corp., 
875 F.3d 746, 752 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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  The public disclosure bar to the FCA, prior to March 
23, 2010, provided that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over 
an action under this section based upon the public disclosure 
of allegations or transactions . . . unless . . . the person bringing 
the action is an original source of the information.”  31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006).  As amended effective March 23, 
2010,5 the disclosure bar is no longer jurisdictional and instead 
provides that a “court shall dismiss an action or claim under 
this section . . . if substantially the same allegations or 
transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly 
disclosed . . . unless . . . the person bringing the action is an 
original source of the information.”  31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) 
(2010); see also United States ex rel. Moore & Co. v. Majestic 
Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2016).  
Whereas an “allegation” of fraud is a specific allegation of 
wrongdoing, a “transaction” that raises an inference of fraud 
consists of both the allegedly misrepresented facts and the 
allegedly true state of affairs.  See United States ex rel. 
Dunleavy v. Cty. of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 1997), 
abrogated on other grounds by Graham Cty. Soil & Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 
280 (2010); Moore & Co., 812 F.3d at 303.  As no one contends 
that, prior to Silver’s suit, PharMerica had been publicly and 
explicitly accused of engaging in swapping, our task in this 
                                              
5 Because the amendment, contained in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”), Pub. L. 
No. 111-148 § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901, is not 
retroactive, see Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. 
v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 283 n.1 (2010), 
claims based on conduct occurring before March 23, 2010 are 
still governed under the prior jurisdictional version of the 
statute. 
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case is to ascertain whether the transactions raising an 
inference of that allegation of fraud were already publicly 
disclosed.  
 
To determine whether a fraudulent transaction has been 
publicly disclosed by information contained in one of the 
enumerated public sources,6 this Court employs a formula of 
sorts, where: 
                                              
6 The list of sources through which the disclosure of 
information would be deemed a public disclosure under the 
FCA was also amended and narrowed by the ACA.  See, e.g., 
Moore & Co., 812 F.3d at 299.  The parties agree that the 
information alleged to have publicly disclosed the alleged 
fraudulent transactions in this case occurred through sources 
that would qualify as public disclosure sources under either 
version of the statute.  See App. 12–13.  The ACA’s other 
relevant change — that the relator’s alleged fraud need only be 
“substantially the same” as, rather than “based on,” the 
publicly disclosed allegations or transactions in order to trigger 
the public disclosure bar — merely codified the law as it 
already existed in this Circuit.  See United States ex rel. 
Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 519 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“To be ‘based upon’ the publicly revealed allegations 
or transactions the complaint need only be ‘supported by’ or 
“substantially similar to” the disclosed allegations and 
transactions.” (quoting United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. 
Hous. Auth. of City of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 385–88 (3d 
Cir. 1999))).  Accordingly, because the legal framework 
applicable to the determination of whether Silver’s allegations 
were publicly disclosed is the same under either version of the 
statute, we need not consider separately the pre- and post- 
March 28, 2010 conduct.  
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“If X + Y = Z, Z represents the allegation of fraud 
and X and Y represent its essential elements.  In 
order to disclose the fraudulent transaction 
publicly, the combination of X and Y must be 
revealed, from which readers or listeners may 
infer Z, i.e., the conclusion that fraud has been 
committed.” 
 
United States ex rel. Zizic v. Q2Administrators, LLC, 728 F.3d 
228, 236 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 741).  
For a court to conclude that an inference of fraud [Z] has been 
publicly disclosed such that the public disclosure bar is 
triggered, then, “both a misrepresented [X] and a true [Y] state 
of facts must be publicly disclosed.”  United States ex rel. 
Atkinson v. PA. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 519 (3d Cir. 
2007).  Where the fraud has been publicly disclosed — either 
because the public documents set out the allegation of fraud 
itself [Z] or its essential elements [X+Y] — a relator’s claim 
will be barred so long as it is “‘supported by’ or ‘substantially 
similar to’ [the] public disclosures.”  Zizic, 728 F.3d at 237 
(quoting United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of 
City of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376, 385–88 (3d Cir. 1999)); 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2010).  
 
In this case, the parties agree that the allegedly 
“misrepresented” set of facts [X] is that PharMerica was 
complying with the Anti-Kickback statute,7 and that the 
                                              
7 We have recognized that “[f]alsely certifying 
compliance with the . . . Anti–Kickback Act[] in connection 
with a claim submitted to a federally funded insurance program 
is actionable under the FCA.”  United States ex rel. Wilkins v. 
United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 312 (3d Cir. 2011) 
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allegedly “true” state of facts [Y] is that PharMerica was in fact 
engaging in the fraudulent practice of swapping, which violates 
the statute.  PharMerica argued — and the District Court found 
— that a number of publicly available reports and documents, 
upon which Silver testified that he relied to deduce the fraud, 
discussed swapping in the nursing home industry and 
accordingly that “the information cumulatively disclosed in the 
publicly available documents was sufficient to support an 
inference that PharMerica allegedly engaged in swapping 
transactions with nursing homes, and therefore the true state of 
facts (Y) was publicly disclosed.”  Appendix (“App.”) 16.  
Finding that both X and Y were publicly disclosed, the District 
Court concluded that Silver’s claim was barred.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the District Court rejected Silver’s argument 
that the public documents could not, on their own, disclose the 
fraud, and that to arrive at his allegations, Silver had relied on 
non-public contracts he had seen that indicated that 
PharMerica was offering below-price per-diem rates for Part A 
patients.  Silver contends that the District Court erred in doing 
so for two reasons.  First, Silver argues that the District Court 
improperly determined that documents publicly describing the 
generalized risk of swapping in the nursing home industry 
                                              
(quoting United States ex rel. Kosenske v. Carlisle HMA, Inc., 
554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009)).  Moreover, as we noted in 
Wilkins, id. at 311 n.19, Congress in the ACA, § 6402(f), 124 
Stat. at 759, amended the Anti-Kickback Statute to state 
expressly that “a claim that includes items or services resulting 
from a violation of this section constitutes a false or fraudulent 
claim for purposes” of the FCA.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–
7b(g).  Some of the fraudulent conduct alleged here, however, 
predates the ACA’s effective date of March 23, 2010, and the 
amendment is not retroactive. 
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served to bar his specific claim, which depended on non-public 
information that PharMerica was actually engaging in 
swapping in specific contracts.  Second, Silver contends that 
the District Court ignored this Court’s guidance when it 
concluded, on the basis of Silver’s testimony, that he relied 
upon certain publicly available information to reach his 
conclusion and that the information itself disclosed the fraud, 
without independently determining that the relevant public 
document did, in fact, effectuate such a disclosure.  We agree. 
 
A. 
 
As noted above, the District Court determined that 
various reports cumulatively disclosed the alleged fraudulent 
transactions.  These reports consisted of:  
 
1. A 1999 advisory opinion by the Health and Human 
Services – Office of the Inspector General (“HHS-OIG”) 
concerning an ambulance company that wanted to provide 
steeply discounted services to a nursing home.  The 
advisory opinion noted that, depending on the intent, such 
an offer might violate the Anti-Kickback Act because it 
provides a discount for services that the nursing home itself 
pays “in exchange for the opportunity to service and bill for 
higher paying Federal health care program business 
reimbursed directly by the program to the supplier.”  App. 
700.  The advisory opinion also noted that HHS-OIG had 
received “a considerable number of informal inquiries and 
anecdotal reports regarding discounts to [nursing homes] . 
. . since the enactment of the [prospective payment system 
establishing per-diem reimbursement for Part A patients]” 
and that the inquiries “suggest that suppliers of a wide range 
of [nursing home] services” are offering Part A discounts 
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that are “linked, directly or indirectly,” to getting business 
that could be billed directly to the federal government via 
Medicare Part B.  App. 700; 
 
2. A 2000 HHS-OIG “Compliance Program Guidance for 
Nursing Facilities” published in the Federal Register that 
referenced the 1999 HHS-OIG advisory opinion and 
defined swapping as “when a supplier gives a nursing 
facility discounts on Medicare Part A items and services in 
return for the referrals of Medicare Part B business.”  App. 
713;  
 
3. A 2008 HHS-OIG “Supplemental Compliance Program 
Guidance for Nursing Facilities” reiterating that swapping 
violates the Anti-Kickback Act and cautioning that “a 
nursing facility should be careful that there is no link or 
connection, explicit or implicit, between discounts offered 
or solicited for business that the nursing facility pays for 
and the nursing facility’s referral of business billable by the 
supplier or provider directly to Medicare or another Federal 
health care program.”  App. 734;  
 
4. A 2004 report by the Lewin Group commissioned by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) that 
discusses specifically the interactions between institutional 
pharmacies and nursing homes and notes that pharmacies 
provide many services to nursing homes at little or no cost.8   
                                              
8 The District Court incorrectly described the Lewin 
Report as “indicat[ing] that long-term care pharmacies provide 
prescription drugs to nursing homes at little to no charge.”  
App. 6 (emphasis added).  The report is clear, however, that 
the pharmacies “provide many services to nursing facilities at 
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5. 2007 reports by the Harvard Medical School and the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission asserting that 
“[t]he [institutional pharmacy] market is highly 
concentrated, with the top three firms accounting for two-
thirds of nursing home beds: Omnicare covers about 
850,000 of the nation’s 1.7 million beds (50 percent), 
PharMerica covers 220,000 (13 percent), and Kindred 
Pharmacy Services (KPS) covers 100,000 (6 percent).”  
App. 696; and 
 
6. PharMerica’s Form 10-k financial disclosures which 
delineated aggregate information such as PharMerica’s 
costs, gross profits, and its bottom line.  
 
                                              
little or no charge” and that they are able to do so specifically 
because they are reimbursed well for their provision of 
prescription drugs under Medicaid.  App. 741; see also id. at 
761 (“[Pharmacies] are able to offer many medication 
administration services at no additional charge because the 
Medicaid pharmacy reimbursement rates are high enough to 
cover the cost of these services.  In essence, states are cross-
subsidizing the cost of medication administration services 
through ingredient and dispensing rates rather than paying 
them directly through nursing facility rates”).  There is no 
indication in the report that any prescription drugs were being 
provided at low cost.  In fact, the Lewin Report indicates 
precisely the opposite, namely that pharmacies are hesitant to 
offer discounts on prescription drugs (i.e., offer drug prices 
lower than the rate set by Medicaid), lest they appear to be 
engaging in swapping.  App. 759–60. 
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The District Court’s analysis relied most heavily on the Lewin 
Report — which the District Court viewed as linking the 
general statements about swapping in the nursing home 
industry with swapping between nursing homes and 
pharmacies in particular — and the 10-k disclosures that Silver 
supposedly relied upon as “the last piece of information he 
needed to conclude that PharMerica was, indeed, engaging in 
swapping.”  App. 17.   
 
Neither of the documents, alone or considered together 
with the rest of the public documents, disclose the fraudulent 
transactions that Silver alleges, not least of which because the 
documents do not point to any specific fraudulent transactions 
directly attributable to PharMerica.  See, e.g., Atkinson, 473 
F.3d at 528–29 (considering separately, for disclosure bar 
purposes, each specific “transaction” in which defendants were 
alleged to have misrepresented the true state of facts); United 
States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar Fed., Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 
495 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a fraud is publicly 
disclosed “when the critical elements exposing the transaction 
as fraudulent are placed in the public domain”); see also Zizic, 
728 F.3d at 237–38 (concluding that public disclosure bar 
applied because defendants were at least “directly identifiable” 
from the allegations that had already disclosed the specific 
fraudulent transaction).  Rather, the documents merely indicate 
the possibility that such a fraud could be perpetrated in the 
nursing home industry, which is an allegation that would alone 
be insufficient to state a claim for fraud under the FCA and 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).  Silver’s more concrete 
claim, which set out specific facts suggesting that PharMerica 
in particular was actually engaged in swapping, relied upon 
these general disclosures but could not have been derived from 
them absent Silver’s addition of the non-public per-diem 
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information.  As explained below, we hold that the FCA’s 
public disclosure bar is not implicated in such a circumstance, 
where a relator’s non-public information permits an inference 
of fraud that could not have been supported by the public 
disclosures alone. 
 
1. 
 
 Both the District Court and PharMerica accord too 
much weight to the Lewin Report.  The District Court found 
that the Lewin Report “indicated that, as to long-term care 
pharmacies . . . in particular, conditions were ripe for swapping 
transactions.”  App. 6.  Likewise, PharMerica relies on the 
report as proof that the Government was “concern[ed] with 
swapping in the long-term care industry applied specifically to 
the provision of services by long-term care pharmacies like 
PharMerica” and commissioned the Lewin Report “to evaluate 
how long-term care pharmacies charge” for their services.  
PharMerica Br. 25.  The Lewin Report explained that 
institutional pharmacies at the time provided many of their 
services to nursing homes at little or no cost and still achieved 
acceptable profit margins, because Medicaid was then the 
largest source of revenue for pharmacies and reimbursed for 
prescriptions at a sufficiently high rate so as to allow the 
pharmacies to offer these additional low-cost or free services.  
However, far from criticizing or noting concern about these 
free tie-in services, the reason that the Lewin Report was 
commissioned appears to have been to ascertain whether the 
pharmacies would be able to continue to provide these 
“customary services” that nursing homes had come to rely 
upon after Medicare Part D replaced Medicaid as the primary 
form of coverage for nursing home residents.  See App. 741–
42.   
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Contrary to PharMerica and the District Court’s view, 
the Lewin Report appears to indicate that the Government was 
aware that pharmacies offered low-cost services bundled with 
their provision of drugs and services to Medicaid patients and 
that it hoped those low-cost services could continue after the 
transition to Part D.  Rather than publicly disclosing the 
prevalence of or concern about swapping, the Lewin Report 
seems to indicate that the Government desired that pharmacies 
would continue to engage in conduct that plainly invited 
swapping and moreover that the Lewin Group was of the 
opinion that swapping was not a pervasive problem.  See App. 
759–60 (noting that pharmacies do not offer discounted drug 
pricing below the cost set by Medicaid because they are 
concerned about the risks of appearing to be engaging in 
swapping); App. at 763 (explaining that pharmacies “prefer 
fee-for-service reimbursement” rather than offering per-diem 
pricing and use true-up clauses to limit the risk they bear when 
they do provide per-diem pricing, by adjusting the per diem on 
a monthly basis to match the Medicaid rate).  The Lewin 
Report simply gives no indication that, as PharMerica asserts, 
“CMS . . . [was] concerned with and actively investigating 
swapping many years before [Silver] filed his lawsuit.”9  
                                              
9 It is not the case, as PharMerica asserts, that “the 
government itself reported on widespread ‘swapping’ in the 
long-term care pharmacy industry.”  PharMerica Br. 33.  
Rather, the HHS-OIG documents discussed the risk of 
swapping in the nursing home industry, between nursing 
homes and their suppliers.  Although pharmacies certainly fall 
into the category of suppliers of nursing homes, they were not 
specifically identified as suspected swappers.  PharMerica 
itself recognized this distinction, as it initially (and correctly) 
 18 
 
PharMerica Br. 26.  Indeed, the Lewin Report does not appear 
at all to discuss discount pricing or swapping regarding 
prescription drugs.  See supra note 8.  The Lewin Report 
therefore does not support or even hint at the inference that any 
institutional pharmacy — let alone PharMerica in particular — 
was swapping or would in the future be likely to swap, or that 
the Government was particularly concerned that the free tie-in 
services would lead to the scourge of swapping.   
 
2. 
 
 The District Court also relied heavily upon 
PharMerica’s 10-k disclosure form, which Silver testified that 
he consulted before filing his FCA claim.  The majority of the 
District Court’s analysis of whether the fraudulent transactions 
were publicly disclosed was dedicated to its determination that 
Silver had conceded that the aggregate financial information 
included in the 10-k was sufficient to support a “conclu[sion] 
that PharMerica had engaged in illegal swapping.”  App. 15.  
At no point did the District Court elucidate what information 
in the 10-k forms disclosed or suggested that PharMerica was 
engaged in swapping or how anyone could use the 10-k data in 
conjunction with information from the other public sources to 
reach such a conclusion.  Rather, the District Court merely 
cited Silver’s deposition testimony, in which he purportedly 
admitted that he relied on PharMerica’s financial statements 
                                              
describes the HHS-OIG documents as identifying the 
government’s concern with “swapping arrangement in the 
long-term care industry” and the “pervasiveness of swapping 
transactions in the nursing home industry,” id. at 23–24, and 
then attempts in its argument section to recast these disclosures 
as concerning the pharmacies themselves. 
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and that the information contained therein permitted him to 
make the “pretty easy” deduction that PharMerica was 
swapping.  App. 639–40.  The District Court rejected as 
“internally inconsistent” Silver’s argument that this testimony 
was taken out of context and that for the disclosures themselves 
to support an inference of fraud, they would need to include 
more granular information about individual nursing homes, 
rather than average or aggregate data.  App. 14–15.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the District Court misapprehended Silver’s 
testimony and the central importance of his non-public per-
diem information to the plausibility of his allegation of fraud.   
 
 The crux of Silver’s allegation is that the $8–10 per-
diem rates that he discovered must have been below-cost (and 
so violate the Anti-Kickback Act) because if PharMerica had 
so low a cost to buy prescription drugs such that it was making 
money on services for Part A patients even with such a low 
reimbursement rate, then it would have been making an 
enormous profit on its significantly more numerous services to 
Part D patients, which Silver contends are reimbursed at a rate 
that is two-to-three times higher.  But based on PharMerica’s 
publicly stated profits in its 10-k, Silver deduced that 
PharMerica could not be making such enormous profits on 
their Part D patients because the company was simply not that 
profitable.  Silver concluded that PharMerica must not in fact 
have such a low cost to purchase prescription drugs, meaning 
that it must be offering per-diem rates to Part A patients that 
are below its costs.  Crucially, while this analysis depends on 
having a general sense of PharMerica’s gross profitability 
(which is public information), the analysis would be 
impossible without first knowing what per-diem rate it was 
offering to Part A patients (which is not public information).  
This is because if the rate it was offering was, for example, $20 
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per day rather than $10 per day, its costs to purchase 
prescription drugs could be higher and it could still turn a profit 
on its Part A patients, while its profits from Part D patients — 
while still better than Part A profits — would not be so 
excessive such that it would not align with the reported gross 
profits.  In order to allege plausibly that PharMerica was 
offering below-cost per-diem rates for Part A patients, then, 
Silver needed to know what the per-diem rate was.  No one 
contends that this rate was publicly disclosed.   
 
 With this understanding of how Silver deduced the 
alleged fraud, it becomes clear that the District Court erred in 
determining that the fraud was publicly disclosed via (1) 
documents indicating that swapping was a risk inherent in the 
nursing home business, (2) documents confirming that 
PharMerica was one of the major players servicing nursing 
homes, and (3) PharMerica’s financial statements.  In his 
deposition statements concerning his reliance on the financial 
statements, upon which the District Court based its conclusion 
that the fraud could be deduced by reliance on the information 
contained in those documents alone, Silver makes clear that his 
private knowledge of PharMerica’s per-diem rates was the key 
to uncovering the fraud.  Without this information, the public 
information that he consulted, which reported that swapping 
was a potential problem in the nursing home industry, would 
have been insufficient to disclose the actual fraud that Silver 
alleges.  As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
observed, “[a]llowing a public document describing 
‘problems’ — or even some generalized fraud . . . across a 
swath of an industry — to bar all FCA suits identifying specific 
instances of fraud in that . . . industry would deprive the 
Government of information that could lead to recovery of 
misspent Government funds and prevention of further fraud.”  
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United States ex rel. Mateski v. Raytheon Co., 816 F.3d 565, 
577 (9th Cir. 2016).  Although we have not explicitly said so, 
we clarify now that the FCA’s public disclosure bar is not 
triggered when a relator relies upon non-public information to 
make sense of publicly available information, where the public 
information — standing alone — could not have reasonably or 
plausibly supported an inference that the fraud was in fact 
occurring.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Shea v. Cellco 
P’ship, 863 F.3d 923, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (public disclosure 
bar not triggered where the relator “supplied the missing link 
between the public information and the alleged fraud” by 
“rel[ying] on nonpublic information to interpret each [publicly 
disclosed] contract,” and where “[w]ithout [relator’s] 
nonpublic sources . . . there was insufficient [public] 
information to conclude” that the defendant actually engaged 
in the alleged fraud). 
 
* * * * * 
 
Having concluded that the publicly available 
information did not disclose the alleged true state of affairs that 
PharMerica was violating the Anti-Kickback law by engaging 
in swapping — what, in the terminology of our mathematical 
representation of the public disclosure analysis, we might title 
the “Y-factor” — the public disclosure bar is inapplicable to 
Silver’s claims.  The District Court erred in concluding 
otherwise.      
 
B. 
 
 This conclusion is fully in keeping with our precedents 
applying the public disclosure bar to parasitic suits in which a 
relator uncovers a fraud based only on the application of 
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background knowledge or experience to the publicly available 
facts, see United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & 
Bustamante v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d 
Cir. 1991), or to cases in which the relator relies “even partly” 
on publicly disclosed allegations of fraud, Zizic, 728 F.3d at 
238.  In both such circumstances, a particular concrete 
allegation of fraud has already been disclosed in whole or in 
part, and the relator is merely extrapolating from or expanding 
on the allegation to include allegedly new fraudsters.  When a 
free-standing allegation of fraud already exists in the public 
realm, the mere application of experience or deductive skills to 
such information or the addition of another allegation to the 
already articulated accusation of fraud does not create a new, 
non-barred, claim of fraud.  See, e.g., Mateski, 816 F.3d at 
579–80; United States ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS Caremark 
Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[A] complaint that 
targets a scheme previously revealed through public 
disclosures is barred even if it offers greater detail about the 
underlying conduct.”).  On the other hand, when, as here, the 
publicly disclosed information lacks relevant significance to 
the claim of fraud absent the addition of relator’s non-public 
information, there are simply no publicly disclosed allegations 
of fraud upon which the relators claim could be based.  Rather, 
the allegation exists solely by virtue of the relator’s added 
information.   
This distinction between concrete allegations of fraud 
and disclosures that might support such an allegation if 
supplemented by more particular information, likewise 
distinguishes this case from cases in which a fraudulent 
transaction was deemed disclosed even though the defendant 
itself was never mentioned in the public documents.  
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For instance, in United States ex rel. Gear v. Emergency 
Medical Associates of Illinois Inc., 436 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 
2006), upon which PharMerica relies, the relator’s claim 
regarding fraudulent billing practices at the teaching hospital 
that he worked at was barred based on the public disclosure 
that such fraudulent practices were taking place at teaching 
hospitals nationwide, even though relator’s hospital — 1 of 
125 such institutions operating at the time — was never 
mentioned in the disclosures.  Id. at 728.  The Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit rejected the relator’s contention “that 
for there to be public disclosure, the specific defendants named 
in the lawsuit must have been identified in the public records,” 
and held that “[i]ndustry-wide public disclosures bar qui tam 
actions against any defendant who is directly identifiable from 
the public disclosures.”  Id. at 729.  PharMerica contends — 
and the District Court held — that the HHS-OIG and CMS 
documents suggesting that swapping may be occurring in the 
nursing home industry and acknowledging PharMerica’s status 
as one of the three largest institutional pharmacies serving 
nursing homes, means that PharMerica was identified as a 
likely swapper, even without being directly named.  In Gear, 
however, the allegations concerning the fraudulent practice 
were concrete and leveled directly at the industry at issue, and 
— most importantly — various hospitals had reached 
settlements with the Government concerning specific 
allegations that they engaged in the practice, and the 
Government was in the process of auditing dozens of 
additional hospitals.  Id. at 728–29.  Given the public 
disclosures that the fraud was actually being perpetrated across 
the industry and the clear indication that the Government was 
already uncovering the culpable institutions, the relator’s 
addition of information specifically identifying yet another 
hospital did not constitute relevantly new or undisclosed 
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information.  In the case at bar, however, the public disclosures 
lack any concrete indication that pharmacies were actually 
swapping, and the most on-point document seems to indicate 
that they were not doing so.  Silver’s allegation, supported by 
non-public contracts plausibly indicating below-cost per-diem 
pricing (which the Lewin Report specifically noted pharmacies 
would not offer) and clarifying the mechanism of the fraud (the 
true-up clauses that imply that the low per-diem rates are 
introductory prices subject to increase, but which PharMerica 
never “trues-up”), has relevance that was lacking in Gear, 
because it implicates participants in an industry that had, as yet, 
never been specifically accused of engaging in the fraud.  See, 
e.g., United States ex rel. Dig. Healthcare, Inc. v. Affiliated 
Comput. Servs., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 37, 49–51 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(explaining that “while the government may be aware of fraud 
and improper payments being made by participants in the 
Medicaid program on a general level, it was not ‘squarely on 
the trail’ of the defendant,” where the purported public 
disclosures “reveal some important background information,” 
but do “not rise to the level of ‘allegations or transactions’” 
(quoting United States ex rel. Fine v. Sandia Corp., 70 F.3d 
568, 571 (10th Cir. 1995))).   
 
Similarly, in Zizic, this Court found that the fraud 
engaged in by two companies was publicly disclosed by a prior 
lawsuit even though the defendants were not named, because a 
prior suit alleged a specific fraud taking place in an industry — 
qualified independent contractors (“QICs”) who review certain 
Medicare eligibility determinations — over a period of time, 
and only one QIC operated in the industry at any given period.  
Zizic, 728 F.3d at 238.  The fraud in Zizic was specifically 
alleged to have occurred in the industry, and the identity of 
each company was readily ascertainable because they “were 
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the only QICs during their respective contractual terms” which 
took place during the time period alleged in the prior suit and 
anyone could look up what company served as a QIC at a given 
time.  Id.  The Court therefore concluded that, although the 
defendants “were not actually identified in the [prior] 
litigation, they were directly identifiable from that public 
disclosure.”  Id.  Again, the same is not true here, where no 
specific allegations of fraud or disclosures of information 
which would raise an inference of fraud had been made against 
pharmacies servicing nursing homes.   
 
 Finally, our refusal to afford preclusive effect to 
information that discloses merely a potential or possibility of 
fraud, without any indication of who is perpetrating it or how 
they are doing so, accords with the heightened showing 
required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) when 
pleading a claim of fraud in FCA actions.  See Foglia v. Renal 
Ventures Mgmt., 754 F.3d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[I]n 
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” (quoting Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 9(b)).  None of the publicly available documents in 
this case indicate that any institutional pharmacy is engaging 
in swapping or is likely to do so.  The Lewin Report is the only 
document discussing pharmacies in particular, and that 
document at most explains the various payment structures that 
would make swapping possible or attractive.  It does not imply 
that any pharmacy is suspected of engaging in swapping, and 
in fact asserts just the opposite — that pharmacies are wary of 
any prescription drug pricing that falls below the price set by 
the federal government.   
 
A complaint based only on these publicly available 
documents would not be able to “support its allegations” with 
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adequate factual detail needed to plead fraud with particularity.  
Moore & Co., 812 F.3d at 307.  At a minimum, for an FCA 
relator to satisfy Rule 9(b), “he must provide ‘particular details 
of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia 
that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually 
submitted’”; “[d]escribing a mere opportunity for fraud will 
not suffice.”  Foglia, 754 F.3d at 157–58 (quoting United States 
ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 
2009)); see also, e.g., United States ex rel. Baltazar v. Warden, 
635 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that “reports 
documenting a significant rate of false claims by an industry as 
a whole — without attributing fraud to particular firms — do 
not prevent a qui tam suit against any particular member of that 
industry . . . because these reports do not so much as hint that 
any particular provider has submitted fraudulent bills” and so 
“do not disclose the allegations or transactions on which 
[Realtor’s] suit . . . is based” (citations omitted)).  In Foglia, 
this Court noted that an inference of illegality based on facts 
that could plausibly have either a legal or illegal explanation 
would be insufficient to meet Rule 9(b)’s burden, because a 
relator must “establish a ‘strong inference’ that false claims 
were submitted” and the possibility of a legitimate explanation 
undermines the strength of the inference of illegality.  Foglia, 
754 F.3d at 158.   
 
As we explained earlier, had Silver not been in 
possession of the non-public per-diem information, 
PharMerica’s financial statements would not have raised a 
sufficiently strong inference of a false claim, because they 
would be just as consistent with PharMerica’s use of higher per 
diems that were not below cost.  Only with the addition of 
Silver’s non-public per-diem information is the allegation of 
fraud raised with the necessary force.  In other words, but for 
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Silver’s knowledge of the non-public contract information, the 
financial disclosures could not have provided specific enough 
detail to allege a fraud under Rule 9(b)’s pleading standard.  No 
plaintiff could have come into court with only the publicly 
available information and survived a motion to dismiss, 
because even if the public documents identify a high likelihood 
of swapping in the nursing home industry and even if the 
institutional pharmacy sector is highly concentrated such that 
PharMerica is an obvious defendant, none of the documents 
indicate that PharMerica was actually engaging in swapping, 
as opposed simply to operating in an environment that makes 
swapping attractive.  See, e.g., Foglia, 754 F.3d at 158; 
Mateski, 816 F.3d at 577; Baltazar, 635 F.3d at 868.  We 
conclude that the public disclosures concerning the potential 
for swapping in the nursing home industry did not publicly 
disclose the actual fraud that Silver alleges, and his claim is 
accordingly not foreclosed by the FCA’s eponymous bar. 
 
III. 
 
Silver also finds fault with the manner of the District 
Court’s determination that Silver’s admission that he relied 
upon certain public documents to deduce PharMerica’s fraud 
meant that those documents had publicly disclosed the fraud.  
He argues that not only did the District Court err substantively 
as discussed above, but also that it erred procedurally by failing 
independently to determine whether the public documents at 
issue in fact contained sufficient information to disclose the 
fraudulent transactions.  Instead, Silver contends, the District 
Court essentially took him at his word that his analysis of 
certain documents alerted him to the fraud, and accordingly 
determined that those documents must therefore have already 
publicly disclosed the fraud, thereby barring Silver’s claim.  
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Silver cites to our decision in Mistick where — discussing 
whether allegations that are “based upon” publicly available 
information must be actually derived from that information or 
instead just “supported by” or “substantially similar” to that 
information — we agreed with the majority of the Courts of 
Appeals that “the relator’s independent knowledge of the 
information is irrelevant” if his allegations merely mirror 
allegations that were already publicly disclosed.  186 F.3d at 
386.  Silver argues based on this that when determining 
whether an allegation or transaction is actually publicly 
disclosed, it is improper to rely upon what the relator says he 
relied on (because whether or not he relied on the public 
information is irrelevant), but instead that the court must 
analyze the public documents to ascertain whether they 
disclose the fraud in sufficient detail.  Again, we agree. 
 
If the information that the relator relied upon is 
irrelevant to determining whether his allegations are based 
upon publicly available information, it would be anomalous to 
rely upon his characterization of the record to determine that 
the information was indeed public or that his allegations are in 
fact derived from those public documents.  Although we have 
not specifically addressed the procedure to be followed when 
determining whether a given document relied upon by a relator 
publicly disclosed the fraud, in Atkinson, we mandated a two-
step process to determine whether the public disclosure bar 
applies.  “First, [the court must] determine whether the 
information was disclosed via one of the sources listed in 
§ 3730(a)(4)(A).  Second, [the court must] decide whether the 
relator’s complaint is based upon those disclosures.”  
Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 519.  For both steps, the court must reach 
its own conclusions based on the content of the record before 
it.  As was made clear in Mistick, a relator’s subjective belief 
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that he relied upon certain information is immaterial to the 
court’s decision, which must be based on an independent 
assessment of the scope of the information disclosed the by 
public documents.  If the public documents disclose 
substantially the same fraud that the relator — even through 
non-public information — alleges, the allegation is deemed 
publicly disclosed, regardless of the relator’s honest, but 
mistaken, belief to the contrary.10  The court in such a situation 
owes no deference to the relator’s understanding of how he 
arrived at his allegations, but instead must review the public 
documents and assess what relevant information can be 
gleaned from them.  It follows that a relator’s honest, but 
likewise mistaken, belief that certain public documents 
themselves disclose the alleged fraud — where in fact the 
documents only effect such a disclosure when read in light of 
proprietary or non-public information held by the relator — 
cannot be the sole basis for a court’s determination that the 
documents disclosed the fraud.11  Rather, as is the case when a 
                                              
10 Of course, if the relator actually relied on non-public 
information to reach his allegation of fraud, he may be eligible 
as an original source of the allegation and thereby “clear the 
[public disclosure] bar.”  Moore & Co., 812 F.3d at 304; 
Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 520. 
11 Our conclusion does not render such an admission 
meaningless.  If the district court makes the independent 
determination that information in certain documents publicly 
disclosed the fraud, then a relator’s concession that he relied 
on that information could constitute a waiver of his ability to 
argue that he is an original source of the information, because 
in that case his information would not be “independent” of the 
public disclosure.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Schumann v. 
Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 845 (3d Cir. 2014).  
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relator claims not to rely on public disclosures, the court must 
first determine whether the publicly available documents in 
fact disclosed information sufficient to raise the inference of 
fraud, and second whether the relator’s complaint objectively 
relied upon that disclosed information.  See, e.g., Shea, 863 
F.3d at 934–35 (considering the content of public disclosures 
that relator suggested in his deposition provided him with the 
information needed to deduce the fraud, and independently 
determining that despite relator’s apparent testimony, none of 
those public documents actually raised inferences of fraud). 
 
Here, the District Court conflated these two steps, by 
basing its conclusion that the allegation of fraud was publicly 
disclosed (step one) largely on Silver’s apparent contention 
that he relied upon certain publicly disclosed documents (step 
two), rather than on an independent assessment of the scope of 
each disclosure.  This is particularly clear in relation to 
PharMerica’s form 10-k disclosures.  Silver at various points 
in his deposition testimony admitted to relying on the 
aggregate financial information contained in the 10-k, which 
the District Court concluded was the “last piece of 
information” that Silver needed to make his allegation.  App. 
17.  But the District Court did not explain how the information 
in the 10-k, even when combined with the other publicly 
available information, could lead to an inference of fraud.  
Neither could PharMerica, when pressed at oral argument, put 
forward any chain of reasoning based only on the 10-k and the 
publicly available information that would lead to Silver’s 
allegation.  Instead, in its brief and at oral argument, 
PharMerica returned continually to the fact that Silver said that 
                                              
But such an admission cannot itself establish that the 
information was publicly disclosed. 
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he relied on the 10-k, and insisted that our analysis must stop 
there.  But as we make clear now, in the context of the public 
disclosure bar, courts may not rest their conclusions based only 
on the relator’s view of the state of the public disclosures.  And 
as we held in Part II, infra, an independent analysis of the 
record leads to the conclusion that PharMerica’s public 
financial disclosures could not, alone or in concert with the 
other disclosures, have uncovered PharMerica’s alleged 
swapping.  Such a conclusion instead depends necessarily upon 
Silver’s non-public per-diem information.  The District Court 
should have independently assessed the 10-k disclosures and 
explained what conclusions could reasonably be drawn 
therefrom — an exercise which likely would have alerted the 
District Court to the central flaw in PharMerica’s argument.  
That it did not do so is a separate basis for our decision to 
reverse and remand.  
 
IV. 
 
 Silver also argues that the District Court erred by 
refusing to assert supplemental jurisdiction over his state law 
claims.  We review such a decision for abuse of discretion.  See 
Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 
2009).  The District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Silver’s state law claims based on its 
conclusion that it no longer retained any cause of action 
establishing federal jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) 
(“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has 
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”).  
Because we conclude that Silver’s FCA claim is not foreclosed 
by the public disclosure bar and that his federal claim will 
remain pending before the District Court, we will also vacate 
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and remand the District Court’s order as to supplemental 
jurisdiction, to give the District Court an opportunity to 
consider exercising its jurisdiction over the claims brought 
under state law.12 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s Order and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
                                              
12 Given our determination that Silver’s allegation was 
not publicly disclosed, we need not reach his alternative claim 
that, even assuming the public disclosure bar applied, the 
District Court erred when it determined that Silver failed to 
qualify for the FCA’s “original source” exception. 
